



*From the Editors' Desk...*

### *In this issue*

#### Commentaries

2021 NPT Review Conference and South Asia p.2

Europe: Facing New Challenges and Dilemmas in the NPT p.4

China Challenge for the NPT p.6

#### Webinar Reports

"European Union's Indo-Pacific Strategy" by Dr George Tzogopolous p.8

"Internationalisation of US\$, EU€, and CN : Opportunities of Developing Nations" by Dr. Violetta Arkhipova p.9

News in Pictures p.10

Feedback p.11

## Maldives at UNGA: A 'Presidency of Hope'

On 8 June 2021, Foreign Minister of Maldives, Mr. Abdulla Shahid, became the President-elect of the 76th Session (2021-2022) of the UN General Assembly bringing focus to South Asia after a gap of 35 years. Bangladesh Foreign Minister Humayun Rasheed Choudhury had occupied this post for 1986-1987. What made it all the more special was that both the main contenders for the post hailed from South Asia and Mr Abdulla Rashid was elected with a huge margin securing 143 votes in contrast to 48 garnered by Afghan Foreign Minister Zalmay Rassoul, presenting a solid mandate to lead the UN General Assembly and pandemic-ridden humanity.

A historic win for Maldives also underscored the salience of this Indian Ocean archipelago, where India remain an important factor, bringing the gaze of the international community not only on contemporary issues as climate change impacts on small island states or the contestation for maritime supremacy in this maritime domain but also on common people who are often relegated to the crossroads of disease, hunger and deprivation, intolerance and subjugation. That the UN must speak for all nations — and especially for those who are marginalised, crestfallen and despondent — stands further amplified by Mr. Abdulla Shahid's election. He has already enlisted for himself the surmounting of some of the most critical and immediate challenges before the world. He has highlighted how it is imperative for countries to move away from vaccine nationalism, stating that 'no one is safe until everyone is safe.' His clear second message is that while intolerance and Islamophobia are not to be tolerated, extremism, in whatever form, should not be condoned either.

Revitalising and reforming key bodies of the United Nations, like the UN Security Council, is not lost on the incumbent President of UNGA. Evidently, the impact of climate change and global warming on small island states is likely to occupy the Maldivian foreign minister, both at home and in the UNGA proceedings.

Given the geo-strategic significance of Maldives and the Indian Ocean, India had wholly supported Mr. Shahid's candidature. But his presidency is likely to see him tread carefully balancing between multiple powers and stakeholders. In an interview to the *The Hindu*, on June 9, 2021, while acknowledging that India's unstinting support helped his election, Mr. Shahid also thanked China for her generosity in deferring repayments through the DSSI [Debt Service Suspension Initiative]. Referring to the possibility of a United States embassy being opened in his country, he reiterated that the Maldives would work with all partner countries' in ensuring the security and stability of the Indian Ocean. India has also placed a proposal for an Indian consulate on the Addu Atoll of Maldives that may also see India's support for Mr. Abdulla Rashid's election translating into an affirmative response.

*Prof Swaran Singh  
Dr. Reena Marwah  
Editors*

## 2021 NPT Review Conference and South Asia

The year 2021 saw an increasing iteration of state policies on nuclear non-proliferation treaties; some were renewed, some entered into force and some have become an issue of heated debate amongst the international strategic community. While the pace of progress had lately been relatively sluggish, these treaties have at least spurred discussion on nuclear disarmament bringing once backsliding treaties into the spotlight. The 10th Non Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (NPT RevCon) marks the 50th anniversary of NPT that stands as the central axis of the world's nuclear nonproliferation regime.



Sunaina Karki

Signed by over 190 countries, NPT was extended indefinitely and unconditionally at its 5th RevCon in May 1995. The 9th RevCon, however, had been a failure. Precisely, due to its inability to produce an agreed final document. This was especially disheartening considering the former achievements of rather efficacious 8th RevCon, preceded by President Obama's launch of the Global Zero campaign in 2008, his Prague Speech and Noble Peace Prize in 2009, followed by the 2010 initiative of biannual Nuclear Security Summits and the launch of US Nuclear Posture Review committing to building a world without nuclear weapons.

*Regarding the upcoming 10th RevCon, the conference originally was to be held in the year 2020; however, it had to be put off twice due to the raging pandemic.*

*Additionally, the third and last Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) session for 2020 NPT RevCon, held in March 2019, had ended without adopting consensus recommendations*

as states parties failed to reach an agreement on the recommendations, portraying the growing split within the NPT community. President Trump's confrontationist diplomacy had surely added to this disunity.

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) or much-touted Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) and slow progress in ongoing discussions to revive the Iran Nuclear Deal, the change in milieu has raised hopes for consensus-building that will strengthen the NPT. Experts also see the TPNW much like NPT itself and therefore tied to the latter's future. However, as many as five Nuclear Weapons State (NWS) — including India and Pakistan — have not been participating in the TPNW negotiations. Likewise, none of the NATO countries that host nuclear warheads of NWS has shown any intention of signing the TPNW.

Despite their nonentity status in the treaty, these countries continue to adhere to most normative standards of the NPT system and are imperative in the survival of this non-proliferation regime.

The preceding RevCons have always stressed the need to persuade India and Pakistan to join the treaty as NNWS. However, this 'discriminatory' nature of NPT and the delicate-dependent South Asian security environment are claimed as the major rationale behind India and Pakistan declining to sign NPT as NNWS. Both the states intend to join the NPT but as NWS. NPT however, has no easy way to accommodate any new NWSs which means that India and Pakistan are more likely to remain outside of the Treaty than join in the treaty in the foreseeable future. This will also continue to make them one big unresolved issue at the RevCons.

Ever since the nuclear tests during 1998 both India and Pakistan have been viewed as ‘proliferation problem’ states. Meanwhile, their turnaround from testing nuclear has been remarkable for the NPT. India has formally committed itself to test-embargo while Pakistan has also introduced some non-proliferation steps.

*The 10th RevCon, therefore, is least likely to be a groundbreaking event for either NPT or TPNW. To the least, this would call for resolving the nonentity status of non-signatory states like India and Pakistan. During the several major NPT events, India has made attempts to project itself as a responsible nuclear-weapon state.*

One such example is the suo motu statement made in Parliament by the Minister of External Affairs when 2000 NPT RevCon was being held in New York. The statement highlighted how India’s policies have been consistent with key provisions of NPT that apply to weapon states. This was followed by India adopting the WMD Act at the 7th RevCon was in session. Pakistan likewise has been a member of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. It additionally has proposed several bilateral or regional non-proliferation steps to India like South Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in 1978, a South Asia Zero-Missile Zone in 1994 including taking commitment for simultaneous adherence to the NPT by India and Pakistan in 1979.

While professing adherence to NPT, these South Asian nations have also pursued nuclear modernization. According to a report released by International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), in 2019, India and Pakistan

spent respectively \$2.3billion and \$1billion on their nuclear arsenals. As both countries reinforce their arsenals, their integration into NPT looks distant, to say the least. The NPT RevCon can encourage both these nations to join parallel instruments like the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) or even make a case for the South Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SANWFZ). Unless India and Pakistan are fully integrated into the NPT-led non-proliferation regime, much of the aspiring NWS will continue to perceive non-proliferation as a matter of choice; this clearly undercuts the argument of NPT being a universal treaty.

## Europe: Facing New Challenges and Dilemmas in the NPT

For past half a century, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) has maintained its grandeur of being the central pillar of the global non-proliferation framework. It undoubtedly has achieved its core goal to keep fewer



Salma Shaheen

fingers over the nuclear button while at the same time promoting nuclear energy for peaceful uses. There have been though few exceptions such as North Korea, Iran and Israel who have consistently challenged the NPT's status. However, besides these obvious challengers, the less understood new challenge of the European Union (EU) has over the years become pronounced. Despite being a member of various nonproliferation enforcing groups, the EU member states have been attempting to redefine their role within the NPT.

In spite of EU's adoption of its Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in 2003, two major developments over the past few years have greatly undermined the EU's role, questioning its relevance to the NPT. These developments include deteriorating major powers' commitments towards resolving Iranian and North Korean proliferation crisis; and renewed emphasis on deterrence in the face of emerging technologies as seen in their engagement with the Treaty of Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).

*Europe had played an instrumental role in charting the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran, and the P5 (members of the UNSC – the US, Russia, China, Britain and France) and Germany.*

from the JCPOA with an aim to put maximum pressure on Iran in 2018 not only disturbed this arrangement but undermined Europe's role in addressing key nonproliferation crisis. This led to Iran scaling back on its commitments

under the JCPOA since May 2019 in a limited fashion (i.e. not enriching uranium to 20 percent) whereas the other parties to the Iran deal (France, Germany and the UK) tried to trigger the dispute resolution mechanism of the deal to take Iran to the UNSC resulting in Iran's signalling to withdraw from the NPT.

With President Biden in office, and his recent personal re-engagement of the US with its NATO/EU allies, hopes for revival of Iran deal have emerged. Nonetheless, Trump's withdrawal has surely dented equations and increased distrust between the US and Iran and both sides are now demanding the other side to comply first fully. In face of April 2021 meeting of all signatories of the JCPOA in Vienna to find ways to initiate the indirect talks between the US and Iran, European states today need to find a way to keep them relevant in this exercise. Iran's nuclear programme concerns Europe due to latter's economic stakes in Iran including investment in Iran's infrastructure, opening markets and negotiating oil and gas deals as an alternative to their dependence on Russia. Under such circumstances, Tehran's withdrawal from the NPT could trigger regional arms race, invite the US/Israel pre-emptive strike that in turn could potentially destabilise the security situation in Middle East, and could threaten Europe as it is well in the range of Iranian ballistic missiles.

Likewise, North Korea presents another example for Iran of a successful withdrawal from the NPT. Iranian leaders have, on different occasions,

signalled their intention of withdrawing and this could deepen their diplomatic isolation accompanied by sanctions, and even a possible US/Israel preemptive strike against Tehran's nuclear facilities. Whether or not Iran decides to withdraw from the NPT, North Korea continues to remain an example demonstrating the fragile nature of the NPT as well as its proliferation record indicates major powers' dwindling prowess to resolve the North Korean crisis. Regardless of these looming challenges for the NPT, Europe has not achieved substantial success in resolving either of these.

*Emerging technologies including artificial intelligence, cyber, hypersonic weapon systems, quantum technology etc are another area that could potentially undermine the NPT.*

This is not to ignore a number of initiatives that the EU and its member states have taken. These initiatives demonstrate Europe's continued interest and actions to help resolve Iranian and North Korea's nuclear and missile proliferation crisis. During late 2000s, the EU adopted a strategy of critical engagement (carrots and sticks) yet the crisis is still there. This strategy needs a change because stability on Korean Peninsula concerns European countries hence North Korean proliferation crisis is significant for Europe. The interests magnify when European powers such as the UK, according to 2021 Integrated Defence Review for Global Britain, are eyeing for dominant presence in the Indo-Pacific region – the region exhibiting great powers' strategic and technological competition.

The new technologies tend to increase nuclear-armed states' reliance and salience on nuclear weapons hence adversely affecting their commitments towards nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament. Deeply divided Europe on nuclear issues is far from playing an active role in mitigating adverse impact of emerging technologies on the NPT. Within Europe, on one hand, Austria and Ireland strongly support the TPNW whereas countries like Sweden and Germany remain unconvinced about it. None of the nuclear-armed states have supported to sign the TPNW. On the other hand, the UK and France are not only modernizing their nuclear forces but are also investing in emerging technologies to explore their potential for security and deterrence.

Despite their nuclear modernisation, both France and the UK continue to support the Iran nuclear deal reflecting their dubious doublespeak. Their NPT commitments seem being pushed away given increased reliance and ambiguity with regards to nuclear deterrence, especially in case of Global Britain as envisaged in the Integrated Defence Review. For major states including European states the stability of Korean Peninsula is equally paramount where North Korea has gradually attained the status of nuclear-armed state outside the NPT like India, Pakistan and Israel. This indicates the lack of a coherent and effective strategy of European and other major powers to deal with the emerging proliferation crisis for the NPT.

## China Challenge for the NPT

China has been one of the most complex cases in the history of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In order to understand China's interface with this treaty — that defines the very axis around which entire non-proliferation regime has been constructed over the years — it is important to understand the shifting sands of China's relative position in international system. How did the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) — a privileged category created by the NPT — view China before and after NPT came into being as also before and after China joined NPT in early 1990s? This equation remains critical as NWS of NPT have also been the P5 of the UN Security Council i.e. five states with permanent seat and a veto power in this apex body.



Abhishek Verma

Russia being one of the NWS in the NPT and a communist state had recognised Communist China the very next day of its coming into being in October 1949. What is generally not noticed is that the United Kingdom had also extended its formal recognition to communist China in January 1950. This was impelled by UK's extensive economic interest in China as also to thwart any potential nexus between communist Russia and China against Britain which was no longer a global power. Likewise, France recognised Communist China in January 1964, nine months before Chinese 1st nuclear test (October 1964). The United States, on the other hand, took long time and rigorous diplomatic footwork to recognise Communist China and till date both remain at loggerheads on several matters. Among others, all this had clear implications for China's interface with the NPT and its related constituents.

To begin with, it is not that US had not tried several times to open up to Communist leaders in

Beijing. In 1963, Kennedy Administration had contemplated but concluded that time was not ripe for US to recognise communist China. Declassified documents reveal that the extensive deliberation in Policy planning council had concluded how even if a possible Chinese nuclear explosion was not be a major immediate threat for US, it would have larger and disastrous implications in Asia especially India, Japan and Australia. Declassified documents contain discussions in US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1961-1999) revealing Johnson administration concluding that “without communist China's participation it will be infinitely more difficult, perhaps impossible in the long run, to prevent nuclear proliferation.”

*Nevertheless, China did not sign the NPT that was signed in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. Indeed, China soon emerged as a major critic of its discriminatory nature. First, the qualitative discrimination was underlined in specific, stringent and intrusive obligations imposed on NNWS while the nature of obligation on NWS expected them to 'pursue negotiations in good faith'. Likewise, quantitative discrimination lay in NPT imposing restriction on horizontal proliferation while it imposes no restrictions on vertical proliferation.*

Nevertheless, China did not sign the NPT that was signed in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. Indeed, China soon emerged as its major critic of its discriminatory nature. First, the qualitative discrimination was underlined in specific, stringent and intrusive obligations imposed on NNWS while the nature of obligation on NWS expected them to ‘pursue negotiations in good faith’. Likewise, quantitatively discrimination lay in NPT imposing restriction on horizontal proliferation while it imposes no restrictions on vertical proliferation (number of nuclear weapons with NWS).

China’s most profound argument for not joining NPT was the absence of negative assurances (NWS to undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states). Chinese also contended that the safeguard terms of the NPT were such that NWS could hinder peaceful nuclear development in the non-nuclear states (NNWS). Hence apart from its nuclear component, NPT also had adverse implications for the economic development of NNWS. But, with its opening up and reforms since early 1980s, China was to become far more collaborative in global arms control efforts, first by joining IAEA in 1984 and then by acceding to NPT in 1992.

There are a number of reasons which can be attributed to China’s decision to join NPT in 1992. For one, Chinese educative experience of being closely associated with nuclear weapons; having tested, stockpiled and learnt about safety, security and safeguard complementarities. Secondly, China under Deng Xiaoping had embarked upon a transformative economic reforms program for which they required greater economic integration, international cooperation, technological and market access and even normative bonhomie among the comity of nations. Third and the immediate trigger for France and China to join NPT could be, inter alia, the collapse of Soviet Union and the Eastern

European Bloc.

There have also been debates around China’s acceding to the NPT and supporting indefinite extension of NPT due to United States and international pressure. China joined NPT following the French decision to accede to it. But China still conducted 9 nuclear tests from 1992–1996 as it had committed to sign 1996 nuclear test ban treaty. Chinese were mindful of the huge asymmetry in nuclear tests with the US. Compared to China’s 45, US had conducted 1,030 nuclear tests. Even then, at the 1995 NPT Review Conference, China supported indefinitely and unconditional extension of NPT.

*And now, at the upcoming NPT tenth Review Conference in August 2021 (originally scheduled for September 2020) has begun to reveal new loose cannons like Iran and North Korea that China is expected to crystallise.*

In run up to the NPV RevCon 2020, China had hosted an official meeting of the permanent members of Security Council in Beijing where P5 states reaffirmed their commitment to the NPT. But they also expressed their unanimous opposition to the Treaty on the prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Taking cue from the working paper submitted by China in 2019 NPT PrepCom, it may call for all nuclear-armed states to commit to unconditional NFU doctrine in 2021 NPT RevCon. This, apart from portraying its overarching desire to portray itself as a champion of peaceful uses will showcase China’s unwillingness to endanger global strategic stability for the want of nuclear disarmament.

## “European Union's Indo-Pacific Strategy” by Dr George Tzogopolous



**AS** Association of ASIA SCHOLARS **MILLENNIAL ASIA**  
The International Journal of Asian Studies

AAS Webinar Series (every 1<sup>st</sup> & 3<sup>rd</sup> Wednesday): Session 43  
19 May 2021 (Wednesday), 05:30 PM- 07:00 PM (IST)

**EUROPEAN UNION'S  
INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY**

**Speaker:**  
**Dr George Tzogopoulos**  
Director, EU-China Program,  
European Institute, Nice (Franc.),  
& Fellow, Begin Sadat Centre,  
Bar-Ilan University, Tel Aviv (Israel)

**Chair:**  
**Prof Swaran Singh**  
President, AAS

**Registration  
FREE**

Webinar Host: **Dr. Reena Marwah**, Secretary-General, AAS  
Register in advance for this meeting @ <https://rb.gy/h8rzlu>

\*Participants will be given E-Certificate on request, who either made comments or asked questions during webinar

Dr George Tzogopolous commenced his lecture by discussing the different aspects of the Indo-Pacific region through European Union's (EU) lens. The speaker's five remarks include the EU as the key actor in safeguarding the multilateral order. The EU is playing a crucial role in the economic sector and in International development; however, it's involvement is missing in the arena of security affairs. He underlined the EU's vision as being strategically autonomous in a changing world.

The speaker highlighted the EU's focus on climate change, Iran's Nuclear Agreement and globalization. The EU's role under the Biden administration is crucial as America in today's world is pressuring the EU not to jeopardize the Transatlantic partnership. Joe Biden's administration is creating different conditions for different transatlantic partnerships which is antithetical to Donald Trump's administration.

The EU has managed in the previous standards to establish recovery funds that will possibly enable its own member states in the post covid 19 recovery stage through loans and grants. It shall be historical as in history, EU for the first time its

member states will sign a bond for recovery in the post covid19 world. Dr. George also spelt out challenges for the EU, viz. the elections in Germany in September 2021 as a result of which Germany may not have a stable government as well as France which is facing huge domestic economic and social issues because of the covid19 crisis. These frameworks portray the role of the EU to the world in the context of Sino-American relations and regional powers.

In conclusion, the speaker focused on the Indo-Pacific region, which has its own definition and implications for the EU policymakers. The EU is attempting to play a role in the region where it had been largely absent in previous years. Moreover, the EU represents a fundamental grouping that can help countries understand how it approaches regions that are far away from the continent itself.

The lecture was followed by a question-answer session.



Webinar Session 44: June 02, 2021 [Link to webinar here](#)

## “Internationalisation of US\$, EU€, and CN ¥: Opportunities of Developing Nations” by Dr. Violetta Arkhipova



**Association of ASIA SCHOLARS** **MILLENNIAL ASIA**  
An International Journal of Asian Studies

**AAS Webinar Series (every 1<sup>st</sup> & 3<sup>rd</sup> Wednesday): Session 44**  
02 June 2021 (Wednesday), 05:30 PM- 07:00 PM (IST)

**INTERNATIONALISATION OF US\$, EU€ AND CN¥: OPPORTUNITIES FOR DEVELOPING NATIONS**

**Speaker:**  
**Dr. Violetta Arkhipova**  
Senior Research Fellow  
Institute of Economics  
Russian Academy of Sciences  
(Moscow)

**Chair:**  
**Dr. Reena Marwah**  
Secretary-General  
AAS

**Registration FREE**

**Webinar Host: Prof Swaran Singh, President AAS**  
Register in advance for this meeting @ [rb.gy/blgzfi](https://rb.gy/blgzfi)

\*Participants will be given E. Certificate on request, who either made comments or asked questions during webinar

The speaker Dr. Violetta Arkhipova, discussed the theoretical aspects of currency internationalization, analysis and comparison of the international experiences of US\$, EU€, and CN ¥, and also gave insights on how these experiences can be used by developing countries. She talked about the hypothesis that currency internationalization does not depend on special government encouragement but is the result of positive economic factors. She highlighted this by articulating details of the US dollar and its dominant position. The factors which increased currency internationalization of the US dollar are two world wars, Bretton woods, and Jamaican systems. Over the years the US\$ has resulted in crowding out other currencies which created a long-term non-competitive world space. Actions like ‘dollarization diplomacy’ and dollar dependence also increased its Currency internationalization levels. She also spoke about the Chinese Renminbi. In the (1980s- 2010s), amidst the global financial crisis in the world, the Chinese currency gave a stability which helped to push CI levels. It is regarded as currency with too state. China follows an aggressive policy to promote CI, one of them being bypassing liberalization.

From 2008- 2016, it followed a three-level strategy for the intensification of CI.

Tracing the currency internationalization of the Euro she mentioned the trajectory first being the preparatory stage (1970 -1999), the market-driven stage (1999 – 2018), and the non-free stage which is from 2018 onwards. It is a currency without a state and in later stages tried emulating the Chinese experience. The process of currency internationalization is individual and depends on varied factors like political and economic. The comparative analysis showed us similar features in CI development paths. Most of the currencies of the developing countries occupy a low position in CI classifications. She suggested some measures like exploiting political factors, strengthening regional position, reducing dollar presence, and eliminating factors that hinder CI.

This insightful talk was followed by a question-and-answer session.

by Aparna Divya

# News in Pictures



G-7 leaders summit at 2021 took place at Cornwall, England where the leaders committed to donate 1 million doses of Coronavirus Vaccines. Credit: Washington Post



Naftali Bennett takes oath as the new PM of Israel. Credits: Reuters



Abdulla Shahid, the Foreign Minister of Maldives has been elected as the president of 76th session of UN General Assembly. Credit: India Today



China has approved a three- child policy to raise the country's declining birth rate. Credits: Indian Express



Bangladesh officially beats India in per capita income. Credits: The Indian Express



Sri Lanka: Sri Lanka passed the Colombo port city bill, funds are from China. Credits: CRFIM and Construction World



Afghanistan: As the US troops in the war-torn Afghanistan has begun to withdraw, The Taliban has started to increase its attack on the Afghan soil. Credits: The Conversation



China-Pakistan to launch Mega news network to counter USA, India and Israel. Credits: First Post



Bangladesh: Bangladeshi people protest against China for their approach towards the Uighur Muslims. Credits: BW Business World



Myanmar Junta to start Suu Kyi's first trial since February coup. Credit: Hindustan Times

## Feedback

“Association of Asia Scholars organizes regular Webinars on recent Political and International issues which is very helpful to us to realize contemporary International Politics and issues. As a Professor of Political Science, I believe AAS is a great platform for Asian Scholars, research and policy makers to exchange their knowledge.”

Dr. Syed Ashrafur Rahman  
 Professor  
 Department of Political Studies  
 Shahjalal University of Science and Technology, Sylhet, Bangladesh,  
 Vice -President, Political Science Association, Bangladesh,  
 Vice-President, Shahjalal University Teachers Association(SUTA)  
 Member, Midwest Political Science Association, USA.

“It is always an honour to be a part of the AAS conferences and webinars. The conference themed “Evolving Multilateralism in Indo-Pacific” was particularly enriching with the immense dissemination of knowledge on the regional affairs. I personally benefitted from all the interesting sessions and the elucidative comments”.

Mrittika Guha Sarkar  
 Research Scholar, School of International Studies, JNU, New Delhi  
 Editorial Assistant to the Series Editor  
 Routledge Studies on Think Asia

"The Association of Asia Scholars promotes IR amid Covid-19 and the Global Power Transition. Today, AAS organizes a webinar on "Internationalization of US\$, EU€ and CN¥: Opportunities for Developing Nations". Thank you, AAS, for the opportunity offered to me to ask a question to Dr. Violetta Arkhipova with the Russian Academy of Sciences. "

Khin Maung Soe, Advisor, MISIS, Myanmar.

### Millennial Asia – Volume 12, Issue 1, April 2021

This issue is comprised of theoretically well-grounded and evidence-driven research papers on comparative issues of Asian countries.

[Click here](#)



**Graphics and Design by:**  
 Ms. Ashmita Deb

**Research and Content Team:**  
 Dr. Silky Kaur, Dr. Gazala Fareedi, Dr Kush Gayasen, Trisha Chatterjee, Ms. Barkha Dubey, Vikhyaat Date, Kura Sunaina, Aparna Divya, Pratyush Pran Sarma



[Website](#)



[Twitter](#)



[Facebook](#)



[Linkedin](#)



[Youtube](#)